W e show the existence of Nash equilibria in a Bertrand oligopoly price competition game using a possibly asymmetric attraction demand model with convex costs under mild assumptions. We show that the equilibrium is unique and globally stable. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to show the existence of a unique equilibrium with both nonlinear demand and nonlinear costs. In addition, we guarantee the linear convergence rate of tatônnement. We illustrate the applicability of this approach with several examples arising from operational considerations that are often ignored in the economics literature.
Introduction
We consider the problem of price equilibrium in markets where multiple firms produce differentiated products. Many firms face the problem of determining pricing and inventory policies in markets where demand depends not only on their own price, but also on the prices of competing products. Section 3 lists several examples of operations management problems that fit this framework. Key questions include the existence, uniqueness, and stability of equilibrium when firms are individually setting optimal prices. We present a set of conditions under which a unique and stable pure-strategy equilibrium is guaranteed to exist in a Bertrand oligopoly price competition model when demand is determined by an attraction model and cost functions are convex. We also show that if individual firms follow a "best response approach" to current prices set by other players, then prices converge to the unique and stable pure-strategy equilibrium. Finally, we provide the convergence rate of this tatônnement scheme.
Demand and Cost Models
In the Bertrand oligopoly price competition model for differentiated products, a variety of demand and cost models has been used. Table 1 illustrates commonly used demand models. We let n be the number of firms, which are indexed by i = 1 n. The demand for each firm is specified as a function of prices. Let p i denote the price of firm i, and define the price vector of competing firms by p −i = p 1 p i−1 p i+1 p n . Also denote the vector of all prices by p = p 1 p n = p i p −i . The demand for each firm i is given by d i = d i p . Demand functions are deterministic but can be interpreted as expected demands in many applications. We assume that firm i's demand is strictly decreasing in its price (i.e., d i / p i < 0) and that products are gross substitutes (i.e., d i / p j ≥ 0 whenever j = i).
In this paper we consider a generalization of the logit demand model called the attraction demand model: where is either 0 or strictly positive.
The attraction function a i · of firm i is a positive and strictly decreasing function of its price. Without any loss of generality, we normalize demand so that the total demand does not exceed 1. If = 0, the total demand of n firms equals exactly 1; if is strictly positive, it is less than 1, possibly accounting for lost demand to an outside alternative. Luce (1959) has shown that the attraction demand model (1) can be derived axiomatically based on simple assumptions about consumer behavior.
1 As discussed in Anderson et al. (1996) and Mahajan and van Ryzin (1998) , the attraction demand model has successfully been used in estimating demand in econometric studies and is increasingly accepted in marketing, e.g., Besanko et al. (1998) . See So (2000) , Bernstein and Federgruen (2004b) , and references therein for its applications in operations management.
We now consider the cost model. We assume that cost is a function of demand alone. We denote firm i's cost function by C i d i defined on d i ∈ 0 1 and assume C i is increasing and convex.
The profit of firm i is the difference between its revenue and cost, given by
Each firm's objective is to maximize i . In this paper, we impose mild technical conditions on the attraction demand and cost models as outlined in §2. We then verify that these conditions are satisfied by commonly used attraction functions and cost models.
Literature Review
The study of oligopolistic interaction is a classical problem in economics. In the model proposed by Cournot (1838) , firms compete on production output quantities, which in turn determine the market price. In Bertrand's (1883) model, competition is based on prices instead of production quantities. In the price competition models by Edgeworth (1922 Edgeworth ( , 1925 , each firm decides how much of its demand is satisfied, in which case a pure strategy equilibrium may or may not exist. In addition, price competition with product differentiation has been studied by Hotelling (1929) , Robinson (1933), and Chamberlin (1933) . An extensive treatment of the subject is found in Vives (1999) . We provide a summary of results regarding the existence, uniqueness, and stability of equilibrium, followed by their application in the operations management literature.
1.2.1. Existence. There are two common methods to show existence of an equilibrium in price competition games. The first method is to obtain existence through the quasiconcavity and continuity of i in p i . Assuming a linear cost model, Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) show that a sufficient condition for i to be quasiconcave is the concavity of log d i p in log p i , which is equivalent to p i /d i d i / p i decreasing in p i . Another sufficient condition is the convexity of 1/d i p in p i . From these conditions, the quasiconcavity of i in p i holds in the logit demand model and the constant expenditure demand model with CES or exponential functions.
The second method shows existence through supermodular games. The price competition game is supermodular provided that for each i, i is upper semicontinuous in p i , and i p i p Topkis (1979) shows the existence of an equilibrium in supermodular games, and Milgrom and Roberts (1990) for monotone transformation of supermodular games. Thus, if the price competition game is supermodular, it has at least one equilibrium. Similarly, Milgrom and Shannon (1994) show the existence of a Nash equilibrium for a generalization of supermodular games, called games with strategic complementarities. Such games include instances of price competition. Vives (1999) summarizes two additional methods of showing existence in some special cases: (i) twoplayer games with decreasing best response functions and (ii) symmetric games in which the best response function of a player depends only on the aggregate actions of others and the action sets are one dimensional. Dubey et al. (2003) use yet another approach of pseudopotential games and show existence and the convergence of a method based on fictitious plays.
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Yet they show neither the uniqueness of an equilibrium nor the convergence rate.
1.2.2. Uniqueness. The most common method to show uniqueness is the following contraction condition (see, for example, Milgrom and Roberts 1990):
or a similar condition in which i is replaced by log i . In general, it is not easy to verify this condition on the entire action space unless the demand model is symmetric. An exception is Bernstein and Federgruen (2004b) , who show uniqueness using the attraction demand model and linear cost model under certain conditions. In supermodular price competition games, the contraction condition (3) is satisfied by the linear demand model with convex costs or the linear cost model and the constant elasticity, logit, or constant expenditure demand models. Thus, these sufficient conditions require either the demand model or the cost model to be linear. In fact, when the action space is unbounded, the above contraction condition (3) is always violated for some large p i . 1.2.3. Stability. By definition, a set of actions at equilibrium is a fixed point of the best response mapping. A simultaneous discrete tatônnement is a sequence of actions in which the current action of each firm is the best response to the previous actions of other firms. An equilibrium is globally stable if the tatônnement converges to this equilibrium starting from any initial set of actions. Vives (1990) shows that if a supermodular game with continuous payoffs has a unique equilibrium, it is globally stable. Little is known regarding the convergence rate of the tatôn-nement in the price competition game.
Operations Management Applications.
There is a growing interest in oligopolistic price competition in the operations literature. To predict and study market outcomes, the existence and the uniqueness of equilibrium are often required. Stability and convergence rate indicate both the robustness of equilibrium and the efficiency of computational algorithms. Bernstein and Federgruen (2004b) study a multipleperiod inventory model with linear costs where competition is based on both price and service level. They also consider the single-period price-only competition, where the vector of service levels is given exogenously and the price vector is simultaneously determined by all sellers. This single-period competition is further described in Example 3 of §3, where demand uncertainty is multiplicative and there is neither a minimum stocking level nor a capacity constraint (i.e., i = − and i = ). For a variety of demand models, including the attraction model and the linear model, an equilibrium exists and is unique. Bernstein and Federgruen (2004a) study comparative statics in pricing competition. Bernstein and Federgruen (2003) and Bernstein et al. (2002) study a supply chain in which multiple competing retailers are replenished from the single firm. In particular, Bernstein et al. (2002) show that the vendor-managed inventory arrangement can coordinate the retailers' pricing decision. All of the above models use supermodular games. Price competition in the queueing-based service systems is studied in Allon and Federgruen (2004) . In their model, firms compete on price and waiting time. Their paper employs the results of this paper for the attraction demand model with convex costs. Cachon and Harker (2002) 1.2.5. Supermodular Games and Price Competition. The existence, uniqueness, and stability of equilibrium results are easily obtained in the case of supermodular games. Yet Bernstein and Federgruen (2004b) suggest that when the game fails to be supermodular, "little can be said in general, about the structure or cardinality of the set of Nash equilibria." Vives (1999) shows that with nonsupermodular oligopoly games, "in general, a wide array of outcomes between the monopoly and the competitive solution are possible." Consequently, it is not surprising to note that nearly all uniqueness proofs in price competition rely on the supermodularity of games and an imposed contraction assumption. Yet Vives (1999) remarks that oligopoly price competition games need not be supermodular and points out examples by Roberts and Sonnenschein (1977) and Friedman (1983) . In the price competition literature, if a supermodular game has an explicit demand model and cost model, it typically assumes either the linear demand model or the linear cost model. The only exceptions are Cachon and Harker (2002) , Milgrom and Shannon (1994) , and Mizuno (2003) . The first is restricted to symmetric duopoly. The second shows existence but not uniqueness. It does not require a convex action space, but requires a compact action space. The third shows uniqueness under a strong assumption on demand: Namely, the demand vector remains the same if the price vector is increased uniformly or multiplied by a scalar.
Contribution and Organization
We show the uniqueness of equilibrium in Bertrand oligopoly price competition using an attraction demand model with convex costs. We illustrate the applicability of our generalization by illustrating convex cost models that arise in inventory and service systems.
Second, the action space of most previous Bertrand oligopoly models is assumed to be compact. Thus, even if existence can be shown for the compact space, an equilibrium is possibly a boundary solution, and no interior equilibrium may exist within the compact action space. Consequently, to identify an interior equilibrium solution, an additional assumption needs to be introduced, as in Benassy (1989) and Vives (1985) . In this paper, we identify sufficient conditions for the unique equilibrium to be in the interior of the set. In particular, we allow unbounded action spaces.
Finally, we show that the unique equilibrium is globally stable and guarantee a linear convergence rate of tatônnement regardless of the initial actions. This is the first paper that identifies the convergence rate of simultaneous discrete tatônnement in a Bertrand oligopoly price competition game. Because the unique equilibrium generally does not have an analytic solution, this result is useful in the numerical computation of the equilibrium.
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines our modeling assumptions on the attraction functions and the cost functions. This section also shows that many common attraction functions satisfy these assumptions. Section 3 lists convex cost examples in operations management, to which our model becomes applicable. Section 4 proves the existence of unique equilibrium, also shown to be globally stable in §5. Section 5 also proves the linear convergence of the tatônnement scheme. Computational results follow in §6.
Assumptions
This section lists our assumptions on the attraction function a i · in (1), the profit function i and the cost function C i · in (2). We show that these assumptions are satisfied by common attraction functions.
We let i = inf p a i p = 0 be the upper bound on price p i , where i may be infinite. Firm i's action space for price is an open interval 0 i . Let
be the elasticity of firm i's attraction function. We adopt the following simplifying notation: f x+ = lim h↓x f h , f x− = lim h↑x f h , inf = , and y/ y + k = 1 if y = and k is finite.
Condition A. For each firm i, (A1) a i · is positive, strictly decreasing and continuously differentiable; i.e., a i p > 0 and a i p < 0 for all p ∈ 0 i . It follows that the elasticity of attraction, (A2) The elasticity i · is nondecreasing. In other words, when the price is higher, the percentage decrease in the attraction function per percentage change in price is also higher. This assumption is central to the existence and uniqueness proofs. It is used, for example, to show that the first-order condition (4) has a unique solution p i for any p −i .
(A3) If a i 0+ < , then a i 0+ > − . It follows that when the price is low enough, the elasticity of attraction is close to 0; that is, i 0+ = 0. This is needed to prove the interiority of equilibria (Proposition 3); in any equilibrium, firm i would never set its price p i = 0. We remark that (A3) holds vacuously if
Condition B. For each firm i, (B1) C i · is strictly increasing, continuously differentiable, and convex on 0 1 (i.e., c i · = C i · is positive and increasing), and satisfies c i 0+ > 0.
is strictly larger than 1/ i i . It means that no firm would set the maximum price in equilibrium because its profits are decreasing at this price. It is needed for the interiority of equilibria.
(C2) If = 0, then c i 1 < i . It means that firm i could profitably serve all demand.
(C3) If = 0, the following technical condition holds:
This inequality holds when there are at least two distinct firms i satisfying i i = . Note i < implies i i = . We note that both (C2) and (C3) are used for the uniqueness proof only (Proposition 6).
Proposition 1 shows that these conditions are satisfied for arbitrary cost functions satisfying Conditions (B1) and (C2):
• Generalized logit attraction function: a i p = exp − i p with i > 0;
• Cobb-Douglas attraction function: a i p = p 
Proof. (i) We get
and a i p = − i p − i −1 . Thus, the elasticity i p = i is constant for all p ∈ 0 i , and a i 0+ = , satisfying Condition A. Also, (C1)
, and a i 0+ = i , satisfying Condition A. In addition, we obtain i i = , and thus
−1 = 1. Now, (C3) follows easily, because in each of the above three cases, 1
−1 is strictly greater than 1/2. Condition (B1) essentially means that C i · is a smooth convex function in d i . Examples of C i · include the linear function and exponential function. More examples are provided in §3. We remark that attraction functions do not need to be identical. Furthermore, even the form of the attraction function may not be same among firms. Analogously, the cost functions need not have the same form either.
For the rest of this paper, we assume Conditions A, B, and C hold. In §5, we introduce as an additional assumption that both C i · and a i · are twice continuously differentiable.
Examples
In this section, we list price competition models for which the convex cost model is applicable. With the attraction demand model, the results of this paper show the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in these models. We present some examples from inventory-capacity systems, followed by those from service systems based on queues.
Inventory-Capacity Systems
Example 1. Consider the pricing problem in the stochastic inventory system with exogenously determined stocking levels. We denote stochastic demand of firm i by D i p and its expected demand by d i p . Demand is a function of the price vector p = p 1 p n . We represent firm i's stochastic demand by Let y i be the exogenously fixed stocking level of firm i. For the first y i units, the per unit materials cost is w i . If realized demand is at most y i , the per unit salvage value of w i −h i > 0 is obtained. Otherwise, the excess demand is met through an emergency supply at the cost of w i + b i per unit, where b i ≥ 0. The profit of firm i is the difference between its revenue and costs, and the expected profit is
and h i and b i are the per unit inventory overage and underage costs, respectively.
Our goal is to show that for fixed y i , this function satisfies Condition (B1). We achieve this goal with two common demand uncertainty models.
• Additive demand uncertainty model:
• Multiplicative demand uncertainty model: 
We can easily show that
is strictly increasing, twice differentiable, and convex in d i . Similarly, we obtain the analogous result for the multiplicative demand uncertainty model, in which
Example 3. We modify Example 2 to model the minimum service level requirement. Suppose that a vector f 1 f n is exogenously specified such that firm i's stock-out probability should be at most 1 − f i . We remove the capacity constraint (i.e., i = for all i) to avoid infeasibility. Then, all the results in Example 2 continue to hold, with the redefinition of
Consider a special case of this example in which the stocking levels are determined solely by the f 1 f n vector (i.e., z i = F −1 i f i ), and the minimum stocking levels do not exist (i.e., i = − ). Then C i is linear. In this case, the uniqueness and existence are first proven by Bernstein and Federgruen (2004b) using supermodular games.
We remark that in Examples 2 and 3, the second derivative of C i with respect to d i may not be continuous. In such cases, the existence and uniqueness still hold; yet our results regarding stability and convergence rate in §5 do not apply.
Service Systems
Example 4. We model each firm as a single server queue with finite buffer, where the firms' buffer sizes are given exogenously. Let i denote the size of firm i's buffer; no more than i customers are allowed to the system. We assume exponential service times and the Poisson arrival process. The rate i of service times is exogenously determined, and the rate d i of Poisson arrival is an output of the price competition. In the queueing theory notation, each firm i is a M/M/1/ i system.
We assume that the materials cost is w i > 0 per served customer, and the diverted customers' demand due to buffer overflow is met by an emergency supply at the cost of 
Algebraic manipulation shows that C i · is convex and continuously twice differentiable, satisfying p n is announced. (3) Each firm i decides on its capacity i , which is the service rate. It takes exactly 1/ i time units to serve a customer. We assume that firm i's capacity cost is proportional to its capacity. The service level is defined as the reciprocal of the expected amount of time spent in the system, and capacity should be sufficient enough to satisfy the minimum service level. (4) For each firm, customers arrive at each queueing system according to a Poisson process with rate d i . We assume zero marginal cost of production.
The expected amount of time spent by a customer in firm i's queueing system is given by
Thus, using the quadratic formula, firm i's capacity should be
The cost function C i is convex and continuously twice differentiable. Furthermore, C i 0 > 0.
We remark that this simple example is a special case of a general model presented in Allon and Federgruen (2004) . They provide extensive treatment of G/G/1 queueing systems.
Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
In this section, we show that the oligopoly price competition has a unique equilibrium. Given the price vector, each firm's profit function is given by Expression (2), where its demand is determined by (1). We first show that the first-order condition i / p i = 0 is sufficient for the Nash equilibrium (Proposition 2). For each value of a suitably defined aggregate attraction , we show that there is at most one candidate for the solution of the first-order condition (Proposition 3). Then we demonstrate that there exists a unique value of the aggregator such that this candidate indeed solves the first-order condition (Propositions 5 and 6). We proceed by assuming Conditions A, B, and C. 
Note that the condition in (4) is analogous to the inverse elasticity condition for optimal monopoly pricing.
Proof. Compute the partial derivative of i with respect to p i ∈ 0 i . We abuse the prime notation and use it for the partial differentiation with respect to p i .
Note that the first factor is negative. Thus, i / p i = 0 is equivalent to setting the second factor to zero, which yields (4). Let l i p i and r i p i be the left and right sides of (4) respectively; that is, 
Observe that there is one-to-one correspondence between p = p 1 p n and
given (and of course, ). Let D i
be the solution to (6) 
Now, as x i →d i = min a i 0+ / + 1 , we claim that R i x i → − . To see this, consider the following two cases:
• Case a i 0+ / + > 1: We have 0 < a 
where the last equality comes from lim ↓0 a i > 0. By rewriting Equation (6) and the continuity of all involved functions,
where the last inequality follows from (B1) and (C2). Then
which is greater than 0 by (C3).
− . By Proposition 3, this condition implies D i 0+ > 0. Furthermore, / + → 0 as ↓ 0. Thus, we complete the proof of claim (i). Now we show (ii). From Equation (6) and Definition (7), Proof. The result follows immediately from Propositions 5 and 6. Proposition 2 implies p * i > c i 0 .
Convergence of Tatônnement Scheme
In this section, we show that the unique equilibrium is globally stable under the tatônnement scheme. Suppose each firm i chooses a best-response pricing strategy: choose p i maximizing his profit i p 1 p n while p j 's are fixed for all j = i. This section shows that the sequence of prices obtained by iterative application of this best-response strategy globally converges to the unique Nash equilibrium price vector (Theorem 2). The tatônnement convergence result not only shows the stability of the equilibrium, but also provides a computational method of finding it. We show the convergence rate is linear (Theorem 3), guaranteeing a certain degree of stability and computational efficiency.
In the tatônnement scheme we propose, a firm does not need to know the attraction functions of other firms. For the best response pricing strategy, he only needs to observe the aggregate attraction quantity of the other firms in each iteration, which can easily be deduced from its own demand and attraction value as well as .
In this section, we introduce additional assumptions on C i · and a i · . We restrict them to be continuously twice differentiable to ensure the application of the implicit function theorem. This guarantees the existence of the derivatives of best-response functions. These additional assumptions are satisfied by most common cost and attraction functions.
By Theorem 1, there exists a unique equilibrium vector, which is denoted by p * = p * 1 p * n ∈ . Define = 0 a 1 0+ × · · · × 0 a n 0+ . Let q * = q * 1 q * n ∈ be the corresponding attraction vector where q * i = a i p * i . Letq i = j =i q j be the sum of attraction quantities of firms other than i.
i + , which are both positive. Suppose we fix the price p j for all j = i, and let q i = a i p i be the corresponding attraction.
Because a i is one-to-one and = q i +q i , condition (6) is equivalent to
Using an argument similar to Proposition 3 and ensuing discussion, it can be shown that there is a unique solution q i to (8) 
Furthermore, i q i is continuous and satisfies 0 < i · q * i < * i . Proof. From the definition i q i and (8), we get
To see the existence of i · , we apply the implicit function theorem to
with open domain, x y ∈ 0 a i 0+ × 0 j =i · a i 0+ . The Jacobian with respect to x is
where
By Conditions (A) and (B1), c i is positive and increasing, a
is positive and strictly decreasing, and i a −1 i is positive and decreasing. Thus, both K 1 x y + K 2 x y and J 1 x y + J 2 x y are strictly negative. Hence, F x x y > 0 and the implicit function theorem confirms the existence of the continuous derivative, · , locally. Differentiating Equation (9) with respect toq i yields
Thus,
and it follows d dq i
Furthermore, (10) implies i q i is continuous, and *
follows from the definition of * i and i q * i = q * i . Proposition 7 implies * i > 0. Let q = q 1 q n . We denote the vector of best response functions by q = 1 q 1 n q n ∈ , whereq i = j =i q j . Note that q * = q * 1 q * n is a fixed point of ; i.e., q * = q * . By Proposition 7, we have q 1 < q 2 whenever two vectors q 1 and q 2 satisfy q 1 < q 2 . (The inequalities are componentwise.)
We now show that best-response pricing converges to the unique equilibrium. We define the sequence
Theorem 2. If each firm employs the best response strategy based on the prices of other firms in the previous iteration, the sequence of price vectors converges to the unique equilibrium price vector.
Proof. Let q 0 ∈ denote the attraction vector associated with the initial price vector. Choose q 0 q 0 ∈ such that q 0 < q 0 < q 0 and q 0 < q * < q 0 . Such q 0 and q 0 exist because is a box-shaped open set.
For each k ≥ 0, we define q k+1 = q k and q k+1 = q k . From the monotonicity of · (Proposition 7) and q * = q * , we get 
where the first inequality comes from Proposition 8, the second one from (12), and the last one from the definition of u k . Thus, 
Therefore, we conclude, using an argument similar to (13),
Similarly, we can show that l k = min i q k i /q * i is a strictly increasing sequence converging to 1.
The following corollary identifies a sufficient condition for the monotonicity of the sequence of attraction vectors (and also for price vectors).
We proceed by induction. Assume that q j > q j+1 for all j < k. Then, 
Using induction, it is easy to show
showing the linear convergence of the upper bound sequence q k (Bertsekas 1995) . A similar argument shows the linear convergence of q k . The linear convergence in the above proposition is not with respect to the price vector but with respect to the attraction vector, i.e., not in p but in q. Yet the following theorem also shows the linear convergence with respect to the price vector. Let p 
Numerical Results
In this section, we perform the computation of the tatônnement scheme using Example 1 and report on its convergence behavior. We first consider the price competition among n = 5 firms. We use generalized logit attraction functions. 
where w i = 1 0, h i = 0 2, and b i = 2 0 for each firm i. The value of y i depends on firm i. We initialize the algorithm with p 0 = C 1 0 C n 0 . The algorithm is terminated when the Euclidean distance between two successive p k vectors is less than tolerance 10 −8 . We use Matlab 5.3 on a PC notebook with 900 megahertz processor speed and 384 megabytes of memory. A typical iteration takes several seconds, most of which is spent invoking the Gaussian cumulative density function in (14). Table 2 shows the equilibrium price vector p * and expected demand vector d * provided 1 5 = 0 5 0 75 1 1 25 1 5 and y 1 y 5 = 0 5 0 6 0 7 0 8 0 9 . The column marked by i d * i is the total expected demand as a function of . The last column shows the number of iterations until termination. We repeat computation with 1 5 = 1 5 1 25 1 0 75 0 5 , and report results in Table 3 .
Using the same vector and y vector as in Table 2 , Figure 1 plots q k − q * as a function of iteration count for each value of . It shows linear convergence as predicted by Proposition 9. The convergence rate of the price vector is also linear, as illustrated by Figure 1 . This figure indicates that the number of required iterations is smaller when there are more competing firms. We now vary the number of firms in competition and use n = 2 5 10. For each n, the set of i values and y i values is given in Table 4 . We fix at 0 01. We obtain similar linear convergence results, shown in 
A.2. Existence and Monotonicity of i
Because a i · is one to one and = q i +q i , condition (6) is equivalent to (8). Because c i · is nondecreasing and a −1 i · is strictly increasing, the left side of (6) increases strictly. Because i a −1 i · is nonincreasing and 1 + · / q i + is strictly increasing, the right side of (6) decreases strictly. As q i approaches 0 and a i 0 , both limits are the same as those in the proof of Proposition 3. Thus i · is well defined. Now the lifting-and-dropping argument following Proposition 3 can be applied to prove Proposition 7, which shows the monotonicity of i · .
